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Abstract 
This paper uses a survey-based approach to test alternative methods of channeling tax relief 
to donors – as a tax rebate for the donor or as a matched payment to the receiving charity. 
On accounting grounds these two are equivalent but, in line with earlier experimental 
studies, we find that gross donations are significantly more responsive to a match change 
than to a rebate change. We show that the difference can largely be explained by the fact 
that a majority of donors do not adjust their nominal donations in response to a change in 
subsidy. This evidence adds to the growing empirical literature suggesting that consumers 
may not react to tax changes. In the case of tax subsidies for donations, this has implications 
for policy design – we show for the UK that a match-based system is likely to be more 
effective at increasing the total amount of money going to charities. 
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The majority of developed countries offer government support to charities in the form of 
tax relief for private donations. Most offer a tax rebate – either deductions from taxable 
income  or  tax  credits  granted  at  the  marginal  rate  of  income  tax;  some  countries, 
including the UK, also offer a “match” element, i.e. charities can claim tax relief on 
donations at an income-tax equivalent rate.  
One of the aims of offering tax relief – whether through a rebate or a match – is to 
encourage donations by lowering the “price” of giving to charity. Empirical evidence on 
the responsiveness of giving to changes in the tax-price is, however, mixed: early studies 
suggested that the price elasticity was negative and greater than unity in absolute value 
(see Clotfelter, 1985, Steinberg, 1990, and Triest, 1998), but later studies found that, 
after  correcting  for  short-term  price  effects,  tax-price  elasticities  were  significantly 
smaller than this in absolute terms.
1  
More recently, experimental evidence has cast doubt on the idea that there is a single 
price elasticity, pointing to a possible effect of the form in which tax relief is offered. 
Specifically, lab and field experiments have shown that offering donors a match has a 
bigger effect on the total amount of money going to the charity than offering a rebate of 
equivalent value (Eckel and Grossman, 2003 and 2008).   
For policy-makers, this finding is potentially important since it suggests that directing 
tax relief through a match rather than a rebate may be more effective at increasing gross 
donations
2  –  but  this  conclusion  is  tempered  by  the  fact  that  the  experiments  were 
                                                 
1 Most studies are US based and exploit changes in rebate rates for itemizers. Randolph (1995) uses panel 
data to find a long-run price elasticity of giving of -.51. Using a longer but similar panel to that used by 
Randolph but a different estimation technique, Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002), arrive at the 
significantly higher estimate of -1.26. More recently, Bakija and Heim (2008) find a long-run value of -.7 
–close to Randolph's estimate. Field experiments studying the responses to variations in the match rate 
offered on donations to individual causes have also found that donations respond to whether or not there is 
a match but not the size of the match (Karlan and List, 2007; Huck and Rasul, 2009). 
2 Gross donations refer to the total amount of money received by the charity, including the value of match 
subsidies. Most previous studies have estimated the effect of tax incentives on gross donations and we   2 
carried out in relation to incentives offered by individual charities and donors’ reactions 
to fiscal incentives may be different. The first contribution of this paper is explicitly to 
test the finding in relation to tax subsidies and to show that gross donations are more 
responsive to changes in a fiscal match than to changes in a fiscal rebate. The UK makes 
an ideal case study because the main scheme through which individuals get tax relief on 
their donations – known as Gift Aid – has both a match and rebate element for higher-
rate taxpayers.
3  
Since allocating people randomly different tax rates was not possible, ruling out a field 
experiment we instead used a survey-based approach, which looked at how individuals 
would  respond  to  (hypothetical)  changes  in  tax  treatment  of  donations.  There  is  a 
potential concern that our results may be driven by hypothetical bias; we discuss the 
reliability of our findings in section 3. The fact that our findings are similar to those 
from the previous experimental studies also acts as a validation of our results.  
The second contribution of the paper is to shed further light on the underlying reason for 
why gross donations respond more to the match than to the rebate. We show that the 
difference holds for a number of sub-groups, including those who reclaim the rebate, 
those with a higher level of understanding of tax incentives for giving and those who 
give substantial amounts to charity (more than £40,000 a year). Eckel and Grossman 
suggest, but do not test, one possible explanation that a match may create a warmer glow 
for consumers since it is associated with a co-operative frame (Bénabou and Tirole, 
2006)  as  opposed  to  the  reward  frame  of  the  rebate.  However,  we  show  that  the 
difference can largely be attributed to the fact that the majority of donors do not adjust 
their nominal donations (i.e. their donations out of net-of-tax income) in response to 
either a change in the match or a change in the rebate. Total donations received by 
charities (i.e. gross of tax relief) therefore adjust more to a change in the match than they 
do to a change in the rebate.
4 Among those who do adjust their nominal donations, we 
                                                                                                                                                
follow this approach here, but also present findings in relation to nominal donations (i.e. how much 
donors give out of their net-of-tax income).  
3 The UK tax system has a basic marginal tax rate of 20% on earnings between £6,475 and £43,875 (2009-
10 rates) and a higher marginal tax rate of 40% on earnings above this. Median earnings in 2009 were 
£20,801. In April 2010 – after the analysis in this paper was completed – a higher rate of 50% was 
introduced for with income over £150,000.   
4 If nominal donations are unchanged then the elasticity of gross donations will be -1 in the case of the 
match and zero in the case of the rebate.    3 
cannot reject that the match and rebate elasticities are the same. We discuss possible 
reasons why donors may not adjust their nominal donations in response to tax changes.   
For policy-makers the finding that gross donations are more responsive to a match than 
to a rebate suggests that, for a given total amount of public funding available to support 
private donations, redirecting tax relief from rebates to a match could result in a higher 
volume of total donations going to charity – at least in the short run. We conclude the 
paper by showing for the UK that it would be possible to introduce a cost-neutral change 
in the system of tax relief that increases the total amount of funding for charities.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant features of 
the UK system of tax relief on donations. Section 3 presents our survey design and 
section  4  presents  the  main  findings.  Section  5  explores  heterogeneity  of  responses 
across  donors.  Section  6  discusses  the  implications  of  our  results  for  policy  and 
concludes.  
 
2  Gift Aid in the UK 
Unlike the US, where tax subsidies for donations are in the form of a deduction, the 
main scheme for providing tax relief on donations in the UK offers a match subsidy on 
donations made by all taxpayers through the scheme, combined with an additional rebate 
subsidy for higher rate taxpayers.  
The scheme, known as  Gift Aid, works in the  following way: individuals donate to 
charity out of their net-of-tax income.
5 The charity can reclaim tax relief on donations 
made by taxpayers at the basic rate of tax, currently 20 per cent,
6 which means that for 
every £1 donated to charity, the charity can reclaim 25 pence.
7 This can be thought of as 
a match on donations made by taxpayers. In addition, higher-rate taxpayers can reclaim 
                                                 
5 When it was originally established, tax relief was only given for donations exceeding a minimum 
threshold. This threshold was initially set at £600, reduced to £400 from May 1992 and to £250 from 
March 1993 and abolished altogether in 2000. 
6 Note that individuals must have paid the amount of tax that the charity is going to reclaim, i.e. the relief 
is a non-refundable tax credit.  
7 In addition, charities can reclaim an additional 3 pence of transitional relief for every £1 given on 
donations made before April 6, 2011 if a claim is made within two years of the end of the tax year in 
which the donation is made. This is compensation for an earlier cut in the basic rate of income tax.   4 
a rebate equal to the difference between the higher rate of tax at 40 per cent and the 
basic rate of tax at 20 per cent on the “gross” equivalent donation, i.e. the amount before 
basic rate tax was deducted. This means that for every £1 donated out of net income, a 
higher-rate taxpayer can get an additional rebate of 25 pence.  
This two-part system is slightly more complicated than the US system of deductions but 
is designed for a tax system where the majority of taxpayers do not file tax returns. Note 
that in order for higher-rate taxpayers to receive the additional higher rate rebate, they 
need to make a claim through a self-assessment tax return (completed by approximately 
a third of all UK taxpayers) or ask for a change in their tax code via a simpler tax review 
form. Either way, there is an additional administrative cost for donors on the rebate 
element  compared  to  the  match  element.  In  practice,  not  all  higher-rate  taxpayers 
reclaim the additional rebate, although it is more common among those donating larger 
amounts.  
Table 1: Tax relief on charitable donations in the UK 
  Gross donations  Cost of tax relief 
Gift Aid  £4,578 million  £1,336 million
(1) 
Payroll Giving  £106 million  £30 million
(2) 
Tax relief on shares or property  £266 million
(3)  £70 million
(3) 
Legacies  £1,932 million  £300 million
(3) 
Notes to table:  
(1) The cost of Gift Aid tax relief comprises Gift Aid repayments to charities, including transitional relief 
payments, and the estimated cost of higher-rate relief.  
(2) Estimated  
(3) The most recent statistics are for 2007-08  
Source: HM Revenue and Customs 
 
 
Gift Aid is not the only scheme offering tax incentives for UK donors. There is also a 
payroll-giving scheme that allows donors to give to charity out of their gross earnings; 
gifts of shares and property also attract tax relief and charitable bequests are exempt 
from inheritance tax. However, as shown in Table 1, Gift Aid accounts for the majority 
of tax-free donations – more than £4 billion in 2009-10 out of estimated total donations 
of around £10 billion.
8 Given the presence of both a match and a rebate element for 
                                                 
8 The figure for total donations is an estimate. However, it suggests that a large proportion of all donations 
do not attract tax relief. This includes many donations made into collecting tins, as well as donations made 
by non-taxpayers.    5 
higher-rate taxpayers, Gift Aid provides the ideal opportunity to test the effect of match 
and rebate subsidies in a fiscal policy setting.  
The effect of offering tax relief through Gift Aid is to lower the “price” of giving to 
charity. The price of giving £1 of funding to the charity is equal to (1 – r ) /(1 + m) 
where r is the rebate rate and m is the match rate. In the UK, the effective match and 
rebate rates are .25, but only higher-rate taxpayers are eligible for the rebate. Both basic-
rate taxpayers and higher-rate taxpayers get relief at their marginal tax rates – for higher-
rate  taxpayers,  the  price  of  giving  £1  of  funding  to  a  charity  through  Gift  Aid  is 
therefore  £.60,  while  for  basic-rate  taxpayers  (and  higher-rate  taxpayers  who  do  not 
reclaim) it is £.80.  
Assuming that consumers care about how much money charities receive,
9 this reduction 
in price brought about by the tax relief would be expected to result in an increase in total 
funding  going  to  charities  (i.e.  gross  donations)  but  not  necessarily  an  increase  in 
individuals’ net donations. Donors may take advantage of the fact that the government 
has  increased  the  value  of  the  subsidy  to  charity  to  reduce  the  value  of  their  cash 
donation, an effect referred to as “crowd out” (see Andreoni, 2006, for a discussion).
10 If 
the price elasticity of gross donations is less than unity in absolute value – as suggested 
by recent estimates (e.g. Randolph, 1995, and Bajika and Heim, 2008) – then the effect 
of tax relief will be to increase gross donations received by charity, but individuals’ net 
donations will fall.  
However, the experimental findings of Eckel and Grossman (2003) suggest that there 
may  not  be  a  single  price  elasticity,  with  gross  donations  responding  differently  to 
changes  in  the  match  than  to  changes  in  the  rebate.  In  light  of  those  results,  it  is 
important to account not only for how tax relief affects the price of giving, but also for 
the actual form tax relief takes.   
 
                                                 
9 This is the assumption in the classic “warm glow” model of giving (see Andreoni, 1980). We discuss 
other possible models in section 5.  
10 If donors care only about how much the charity receives and not their own contribution (i.e. they are 
pure altruists), then there is likely to be 100% crowd out; if donors also care about their own contribution 
to the charity (i.e. if they are warm glow givers) then it will be less than this.    6 
3   Sample and survey design 
Eckel and Grossman (2003) tested responses to a match and a rebate in a laboratory 
experiment  that  involved  181  undergraduate  students  each  given  twelve  allocation 
problems  varying  in  the  initial  endowment  and  match  and  rebate  rates.  In  the 
experiment, match rates resulted in gross donations that were 1.2 to 2 times greater than 
the equivalent-value rebate. The estimated elasticity of gross donations with respect to 
the price was -1.14 compared a rebate elasticity of -.36. Similar results were obtained 
from a field experiment (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). Based on approximately 7,000 
responses  to  a  mail-out  on  behalf  of  Minnesota  Public  Radio,  offering  match  rates 
resulted in a higher level of gross donations than equivalent-value rebates. The estimated 
elasticity of gross donations was -1.05 in the case of the match rate and -.11 in the case 
of the rebate rate.  
These findings are potentially relevant for policy design since they imply that fiscal 
incentives involving a match could be more effective than rebate incentives at increasing 
the amount of money going to charities. However, there are a number of reasons why 
the  response  to  tax  incentives  may  be  different  to  the  response  to  single  charity 
incentives,  including  possible  substitution  effects  associated  with  single  charity 
incentives which change the relative prices of giving to different charities, as well as the 
fact that donors may interpret the offer of a match or rebate for a single charity as a 
quality signal for a particular organisation. For policy-makers, this makes it important to 
find evidence that the finding holds in relation to tax-price changes as well as in relation 
to single-charity incentives.  
An ideal – though not practically possible – test would have involved replicating the 
field experiments but offering individuals randomly different tax treatments. Nor was 
there sufficient variation in past match and rebate rates in the UK to allow us credibly to 
identify the separate effects using survey data on donations. Instead, we used a survey-
based approach where we asked individuals how they would respond to (hypothetical) 
changes in the tax treatment.   
Hypothetical  surveys  have  been  widely  used  in  environmental  valuations  to  obtain 
estimates  of  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  where  market  measures  are  unavailable. 
These  estimates  have  been  shown  to  be  potentially  subject  to  bias,  with  individuals 
typically overstating their willingness to pay when compared to alternative, revealed 
preference methods (see List and Gallett, 2001, for a survey). For example, Alpizar et al 
(2008) find that actual donations to a national park are much lower than hypothetical   7 
donations to the same cause. Hypothetical bias is an obvious potential concern with our 
study.   
However, our survey differs from these previous studies in an important respect in that 
we are not interested directly in the amount of donors’ hypothetical donations, but in 
how those donations would respond to changes in fiscal incentives. A priori, it is not 
clear whether – or how – hypothetical bias will affect our results. It is possible that 
individuals may overstate the extent to which they would respond by adjusting their 
donation out of net-of-tax income since, first, they are directly informed in the survey 
about the change in tax treatment and, second, they incur no real adjustment costs (eg 
changing standing orders or direct debits); alternatively they may understate the extent 
to which they would respond in practice since a “no adjustment” response is the easiest 
answer to give.    
We tried to mitigate any potential bias in a number of ways. At the start, the respondents 
were informed that the survey was carried out on behalf of the UK Treasury and they 
should answer questions carefully and honestly to “ensure that any changes in the tax 
treatment of donations are designed to help both donors and charities.” We also made 
the hypothetical scenarios more concrete by asking respondents to consider how the 
alternative tax treatments would affect a specific donation that they had previously in the 
survey said that they were likely to make in the next six months rather than asking 
generally how they would respond to a change in tax incentives.  
Also, the survey itself contained a number of consistency checks. Respondents were 
asked to respond to two scenarios, allowing us to assess whether they were taking the 
survey seriously (by checking for variation across the two scenarios) as well as checking 
for consistency. For example, we deliberately included the same treatment twice but in a 
different  order  to  rule  out  so-called  “embedding  effects”  (the  phenomenon  that  the 
responses  depend  on  the  way,  and  the  order,  in  which  questions  are  presented,  see 
Diamond and Hausman, 1994). We discuss the consistency of our results in more detail 
in the next section.   
Finally, the earlier experimental studies also provide some validation of our findings. 
The  fact  that  we  reach  similar  conclusions  to  the  earlier  studies  gives  us  greater 
confidence that our results were not driven by hypothetical bias.  
3.1   The sample   8 
Invitations to take part in an on-line survey were e-mailed to 40,000 donors, split equally 
between people with a Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) Charity Account and people 
who had donated online through Justgiving during the previous six months.   
CAF is a charity that, among a range of services for individuals and charities, provides a 
charity  account  to  donors  to  facilitate  tax-efficient  giving.  Individuals  pay  into  an 
account and use the funds to make donations to any registered charity (currently more 
than 80,000) through a variety of different means (direct debit, online, by phone or using 
a CAF card or cheque book). For the survey, the relevant population consisted of 32,339 
CAF account-holders with an e-mail address. E-mail invites were sent to a randomly 
selected sample of 20,000 individuals within this population.   
Justgiving is an online giving portal that processes donations from individuals direct to 
charity and individual sponsorships of charity fundraisers. Justgiving reclaims tax relief 
at the basic rate of tax (assuming the donor is a taxpayer) and passes on the donations 
and  the  tax  relief  to  member  charities.  Since  it  started  in  1994,  it  has  processed 
donations for more than 8,000 charities. For the survey, a random sample of 20,000 
donors were sent an e-mail invite out of a total population of 2.56 million who had 
donated via Justgiving in the past six months.  
The response rates were 9.86% among the CAF sample and 9.19% among the Justgiving 
sample. After some data cleaning, our analysis sample comprises 3,146 donors – 1,442 
higher-rate taxpayers and 1,704 basic-rate taxpayers.
11 In this paper we focus on higher-
rate taxpayers who faced changes in match and rebate incentives.
12 Descriptive statistics 
on this sample are summarised in Appendix 1. Due to both sampling and response bias, 
our responses are unlikely to be fully representative of the UK population of Gift Aid 
donors. In Appendix 1 we present some evidence that we over-sample larger donors; 
respondents may also be better informed about in tax incentives than the average Gift 
Aid donor. Section 5  analyses responses  among various sub-groups,  which  gives  an 
indication of how this is likely to affect our results.  
 
                                                 
11 A small-scale pilot was used to test the questionnaire and observe response rates. In the pilot, 
individuals were randomly offered a small financial inducement to take part but this had no significant 
effect on response rates and was not offered in the main survey. 
12 We also designed specific scenarios for basic-rate taxpayers. These are discusssed in Scharf and Smith 
(2009)    9 
3.2   Survey design 
The  overall  design  of  our  study  was  broadly  consistent  with  the  field  experiments 
described  above.
13  Survey  respondents  were  randomly  allocated  across  “treatments” 
offering different levels of match and/or rebate subsidy in order to test how donations 
respond.  
Respondents were randomly allocated to one of five treatment groups each of which 
contained  two  hypothetical  scenarios  reflecting  different  combinations  of  match  and 
rebate. All the scenarios are summarized in Table 2. The design and description of the 
scenarios in the survey reflect the way Gift Aid is currently portrayed to donors – i.e. the 
charity receives X pence for every £1 given out of net-of-tax income and the individual 
can reclaim X pence for every £1 given out of net-of-tax income.  
Before being presented with the scenarios, respondents were first asked whether they 
were likely to make a donation in the next six months – and how much they were likely 
to give. For each scenario, respondents were asked how the change in tax would affect 
this specific “initial donation”.
 14 Appendix A2 provides further information on how the 
hypothetical  scenarios  appeared  in  the  on-line  survey.  Note  that  the  specific  terms, 
“match” and “rebate” were not used in the survey because they are not used in relation 
to the Gift Aid scheme in practice. Respondents were first asked whether the change in 
tax treatment would mean they would give the same, give more or give less. Follow-up 
questions then asked how much they would give if they reported that their donation 
would change. 
Table 2: Alternative tax treatments 
















  m = .25, r = .25  .600           
(a) Changes in either match or rebate 
                                                 
13 See also Karlan and List (2007) and Huck and Rasul (2009). 
14 Only 10% of respondents said that they were unlikely to give in the next six months. Where this was the 
case, they were asked about a specific donation they had made within the past six months. Whether 
individuals were asked about a future or past donation made no significant difference to the responses.     10 
A1  m = .30, r = .25  .577  A2  m = .25, r = .30  .560  £2,211  290 
B1  m = .20, r = .25  .625  B2  m = .25, r = .20  .640  £2,818  293 
(b) Changes in both match and rebate 
C1  m = .50, r = 0  .667  C2  m = .30, r = 0  .769  £2,043  289 
D1  m = .30, r = 0  .769  D2  m = .37, r = 0  .730  £1,905  288 
E1  m = .66, r = 0  .600  E2  m = .50, r = 0  .667  £2,934  282 
Two treatment groups – set A and set B in panel (a) – tested responses to changes in 
either the match or the rebate (but not both). Note that the changes in match and rebate 
were symmetrical in terms of pence change for each £1 donated but, as shown in column 
(III), not price changes.
15 This is in contrast to Eckel and Grossman (2003, 2008) who 
defined match and rebate pairs that were equivalent in value but had different rates – for 
example, a 25% match and a 20% rebate. However, experimental evidence shows that 
individuals respond differently to alternatives that produce exactly the same outcome but 
that  are  presented  to  them  through  different  “frames  of  reference”  (Kahneman  and 
Tversky, 1979). In this case, there is a potential concern that donors may respond more 
to what they perceive is a “larger” match.  
In our survey, the changes in the match and rebate are expressed in terms of equal pence 
changes but are not equivalent in terms of price. For example, in Set A, individuals are 
faced with two scenarios: 
1)  A match of 30 pence and a rebate of 25 pence (price of giving = .577); 
2)  A match of 25 pence and a rebate of 30 pence (price of giving = .560). 
If the match and rebate elasticities are the same, there should be a larger percentage 
change in gross donations under (2) because the price change is greater. If the donor 
perceives the changes under (1) and (2) to be equivalent, gross donations should respond 
in the same way under both. If we find that gross donations respond less to (2), this is a 
strong indication that donations are less  responsive to changes in the  rebate than to 
changes in the match.  
The other treatment groups – sets C, D and E in panel (b) – were designed to explore 
responses to specific, possible policy options. They involved scenarios that eliminated 
                                                 
15 The choice to make the changes symmetrical in terms of pence was to make it easier for respondents to 
understand the proposed changes since they reflected the way Gift Aid is typically presented.    11 
the rebate altogether and made the match subsidy more generous. In set E, scenario 1 the 
match is 66 pence, changing the form of the tax subsidy but not the price. The other 
scenarios in sets C, D and E, while increasing the generosity of the  match subsidy, 
involve  increases  in  the  price  of  giving  compared  to  the  current  system.  The  same 
scenarios were included twice (C1 & E2 and C2 & D1) to test for embedding effects. 
Table 2 also summarizes the number of people faced with each scenario and the average 
amount donated by these individuals through Gift Aid over the previous 12 months. 
While there is some variation in donations across scenarios, none of the differences is 
statistically significant, indicating that the random allocation was effective. 
4  Estimating responses to match and rebate  
In order to look at the effect of alternative tax treatments on donations, we estimate a 
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where din is the donation of individual i for scenario n, including the baseline case and 
up  to  two  hypothetical  changes  to  the  tax  treatment.  We  include  a  set  of  binary 
indicators for each of the hypothetical scenarios that our respondents were faced with 
(T1i = 1 if m = .30 and r = .25 and T1i = 0 otherwise; T2i = 1 if m = .25 and r = .30 and 
and  T2i  =  0  otherwise;  and  so  on).  The  error  term  is  decomposed  into  a  constant, 
individual-specific  effect  and  a  pure  random  error  term  that  can  be  thought  of  as 
capturing rounding or reporting error for each individual for each scenario they face, i.e. 
in i in u v + =a . We estimate (1) using a random effects model.
16  
In the first instance, we include indicators for all ten scenarios to test for embedding 
effects (i.e. separately including indicators for each scenario, even for those scenarios 
which represent the same match-rebate pairs). Tests for significant differences across the 
scenarios, reported in Appendix A3, showed there were significant differences in gross 
donations across distinct scenario pairs and not across same scenario pairs. This acts a 
check on the reliability of our results, and is consistent with there being no embedding 
effects.  
                                                 
16 This is efficient and unbiased if the rebate and match terms are unrelated to individuals’ characteristics. 
Since the rebate and match terms are randomly allocated to individuals this should be true by assumption. 
Very similar results were obtained from a fixed effects model.   12 
With no significant difference in donations across same-scenario pairs, we choose to 
focus the rest of the analysis on the smaller set of eight distinct scenarios. We present 
results separately for “reclaimers” and “non-reclaimers”. In practice, many higher-rate 
taxpayers (44% in our sample) do not reclaim the rebate although the probability of 
reclaiming is closely linked to the amount donated – from fewer than 20% of those who 
give a few pounds a year through Gift Aid to around 75% of those who give more than 
£2,000 a year. Assuming that the rebate is not relevant to non-reclaimers, the base price 
is different for two groups – 0.6 for reclaimers and 0.8 for non-reclaimers – and the price 
effects brought about by the proposed tax changes are also likely to be different for the 
two  groups.  In  particular,  the  scenarios  that  involve  withdrawing  the  rebate  and 
increasing the match (panel b in Table 2) lower the price of giving for non-reclaimers, 
while the price for reclaimers is higher or, at best, unchanged. This makes it important to 
look at the two groups separately. 
One of the features of our survey is that the pseudo-panel element allows us to see 
exactly how individuals respond to each of the proposed tax changes. Column (1) shows 
the proportion who report that they would adjust their donation for each scenario. In 
practice, we find that donors are not very responsive to the proposed tax changes with 
the majority of donors reporting that they would not adjust their nominal donations (i.e. 
out of net-of-tax income).  
A potential concern is that this finding on non-responsiveness may be an artefact of the 
hypothetical nature of the survey; it may be easiest for respondents to report that they 
would give the same. However, the proportion adjusting varies significantly across the 
scenarios and in many cases, this is because the same individual reports that they will 
adjust in the case of one of the scenarios and not the other. We also find that larger 
donors are more likely to adjust.    
Column (2) reports the coefficients on the treatment indicators from estimating equation 
(1) with (ln) nominal donations as the dependent variable, showing the extent to which 
donations  out  of  net  of  tax  income  adjust.  Column  (3)  shows  the  coefficients  from 
estimating the same equation but with (ln) gross donations on the left-hand side, i.e. 
including the change in the value of the match where appropriate. These results are 
directly  comparable  with  those  from  previous  studies  which  focus  on  the  amount 
received by the charity.  
Among the responses, there are some anomalies – such as non-reclaimers who report 
that they would adjust to changes in the rebate. However, generally, the responses seem 
plausible.  Non-reclaimers  respond  by  increasing  their  nominal  donations  when  the   13 
match rate increases – and generally respond more to bigger increases in the match rate 
(i.e. to bigger price changes).  Among reclaimers, we also find that a higher proportion 
adjusts to changes in the rebate than to changes in the match. This is plausible since, in 
the case of a change in rebate, individuals need to adjust their nominal donation in order 
for the price change to have any effect on the amount received by the charity while, in 
the  case  of  the  match,  the  change  in  match  rate  will  directly  impact  on  charities’ 
incomes. We return to this issue of the differential impact of changes in the match and 
rebate in the next section. Reclaimers react to the withdrawal of the rebate (and increase 
in match) by reducing their nominal donations, although typically the extent to which 
they reduce donations is not enough to compensate for the withdrawal of the rebate, 
such  that  gross  donations  increase  significantly  even  when  the  price  rises  for  all 
scenarios apart from (C2, D1). This explains why the implied elasticity estimates have 
the “wrong” sign for these scenarios.  




(2) Dependent variable 
= ln(nominal donation) 
(2) Dependent variable 
 = ln(gross donation) 
Scenario  Adjusting  Coeff               SE  Coeff             SE           Elasticity  
Reclaimers 
A1  m = .30, r = .25  0.149  .0261  (.0064)  .0653  (.0064)  -1.703 
A2  m = .25, r = .30  0.377  .0505  (.0065)  .0505  (.0065)  -0.758 
B1  m = .20, r = .25  0.086  .0036  (.0063)  -.0372  (.0063)  -0.893 
B2  m = .25, r = .20  0.126  -.0049  (.0063)  -.0050  (.0063)  -0.075 
E1  m = .66, r = 0  0.239  -.0212  (.0063)  .2664  (.0063)  -- 
C1, E2  m = .50, r = 0  0.225  -.0207  (.0044  .1615  (.0044  1.258 
D2  m = .37, r = 0  0.266  -.0314  (.0062)  .0602  (.0062)  0.278 
C2, D1  m = .30, r = 0  0.222  -.0368  (.0044)  .0024  (.0044)  0.009 
Non-reclaimers 
A1  m = .30, r = .25  0.059  .0025  (.0063)  .0417  (.0063)  -1.084 
A2  m = .25, r = .30  0.090  .0136  (.0063)  .0136  (.0063)  -- 
B1  m = .20, r = .25  0.024  .0079  (.0065)  -.0329  (.0065)  -0.790 
B2  m = .25, r = .20  0.012  .0024  (.0065)  .0024  (.0065)  -- 
E1  m = .66, r = 0  0.130  .0281  (.0065)  .3157  (.0065)  -1.262 
C1, E2  m = .50, r = 0  0.146  .0288  (.0046)  .2111  (.0046)  -1.373 
D2  m = .37, r = 0  0.125  .0202  (.0060)  .1119  (.0060)  -1.279 
C2, D1  m = .30, r = 0  0.067  .0062  (.0044)  .0454  (.0044)  -1.172 
 
The  implied  elasticities,  shown  in  the  final  column,  are  based  on  the  estimated   14 
percentage  change  in  gross  donations  and  the  associated  percentage  price  change, 
assuming  that  the  base  price  is  0.6  for  reclaimers  and  0.8  for  non-reclaimers.  We 
additionally  assume  that  changes  in  the  rebate  have  no  effect  on  the  price  for  non-
reclaimers.
17 In three cases, the elasticity is not defined because there is no change in 
price. We focus on the elasticity of gross donations for comparability  with previous 
studies – both the earlier experimental studies  by Eckel and Grossman and also the 
numerous studies which have estimated tax price elasticities.  
Focusing on the cases where there are changes to either the match or the rebate, but not 
both (i.e. scenarios A1 – B2 for both reclaimers and non-reclaimers and scenarios C1 – 
E2 for non-reclaimers), our findings are broadly in line with the earlier experimental 
studies in that the match elasticity (range -0.790 – -1.703) is greater in absolute terms 
than the rebate elasticity (range -0.075 – -0.758), although the magnitudes of both the 
match and rebate elasticities are greater than in previous studies. One factor explaining 
this may be differences in sample composition across the studies since we over-sample 
big donors and, as we show in the next section, there is some variation in elasticities 
across the population, according to characteristics such as size of donation.
18  
Our results also show that individuals are much more likely to increase their donations 
in response to an increase in the generosity of the tax incentives than they are to cut their 
donations in response to a decrease in generosity. If robust, this is an interesting finding, 
although we cannot rule out that individuals do not want to appear to be ungenerous and 
understate  the  extent  to  which  they  would  reduce  their  donations  (and  overstate  the 
extent  to  which  they  would  increase  their  donations).  However,  while  this  may  be 
attributable to hypothetical bias, it does not affect the main finding on the differential 
responses to changes in match and rebate consistent with previous studies. 
5  Heterogeneity of responses 
In this section we explore the responsiveness of gross donations to changes in the match 
and rebate  among a number of sub-groups. The aim is both to illustrate differences 
                                                 
17 It is possible that tax price changes affect the probability of reclaiming but this is not something that we 
can address using the survey.   
18 There is no information on the sample composition in Eckel and Grossman’s (2008) field experiment 
which would allow us to make a direct comparison. One further possible source of difference is that our 
results correspond only to adjustment on the intensive margin since we sample people who give through 
Gift Aid.    15 
across groups and to explore possible explanations for the observed difference between 
match and rebate elasticities.  
Table 4 reports estimates of elasticities for different sub-groups. We focus on higher-rate 
taxpayers and on responses to changes in either the match or the rebate (i.e. the set of 
four scenarios A1 – B2 in Table 2). Because of the smaller number of observations in 
each group we pool across the four scenarios and run regressions of the form:
19 
ln gin= β0 + βr ln (1 − rs) − βm ln (1 + ms) + vin      (2) 
where gin is gross donation of individual i in scenario n, βm and βr capture the elasticity 
of gross donations with respect to the match and rebate, respectively. As in equation (1) 
we assume vin can be decomposed into a constant, individual-specific effect and a pure 
random error term. We estimate (2) using a random effects model. Note that when we 
estimate this equation for our sample of higher-rate taxpayers, the estimated match and 
rebate elasticities are brought much closer to the earlier experiment results (Table 4, 
panel a).  
 
5.1   Size of donations 
Table 4 shows elasticity estimates by size of total donations, focusing on higher-rate 
reclaimers. There is some evidence that donations from larger donors are more sensitive 
to changes in the rebate than donations from smaller donors. Given that we over-sample 
large donors, our results are therefore likely to be an under-estimate of the difference in 
match  and  rebate  elasticity  among  the  population.  Even  in  the  top  decile,  however, 
which includes donors who give £40,000 a year or more, the estimated match elasticity 
is significantly greater than the rebate elasticity. 
 
5.2  Level of understanding 
One possible explanation for the differential response to match and rebate rates could be 
that people don’t really understand the two types of incentives – and understand them 
differently. To explore this, we analyse the responses separately for donors according to 
their likely level of understanding of tax incentives. This is assessed on the basis of their 
response to a question about how much the match is worth to charities. Respondents are 
                                                 
19 This assumes that gross donations depend on the price in the following way gi = θi q
 βr ,  where  
q = (1 − r) / (1 + m)
βm /βr, and βm/βr is the relative weight given to the match compared to the rebate in 
the price of giving.   16 
told that the charity can reclaim basic-rate tax and asked to say how much the charity 
gets for each £1 donated out of net-of-tax income (choosing one out of a set of possible 
responses).  If  they  respond  correctly,  we  define  them  as  having  a  good  level  of 
understanding. If they do not choose the correct answer, we define them as having a 
poor level of understanding. We find some difference between those with “good” and 
“poor”  understanding”  –  those  with  a  good  understanding  are  more  responsive  to 
changes in both match and rebate (this may also reflect the fact that they typically give 
more). Nevertheless, we find that the match elasticity is significantly higher than the 
rebate elasticity for both groups. 
 
 
        Table 4: Estimated elasticities for sub-groups  
  Estimated match elasticity  Estimated rebate elasticity  p-value  
(a) All   -1.127  (.067)  -.212  (.041)  .0000 
Reclaimers  -1.277  (.096)  -.415  (.091)  .0000 
Non-reclaimers  -.946  (.091)  .032  (.054)  .0000 
(b) Size of donations (higher-rate reclaimers) 
Quartile 1: £334  -1.177  (.220)  -.473  (.132)  .0002 
Quartile 2: £1,056  -1.220  (.170)  -.277  (.119)  .0000 
Quartile 3: £2,951  -1.154  (.180)  -.366  (.110)  .0000 
Quartile 4: £20,193  -1.496  (.202)  -.559  (.123)  .0000 
Top decile: £39,127  -1.207  (.334)  -.486  (.199)  .0170 
(c) Level of understanding (higher-rate reclaimers) 
“Good”  -1.368  (.116)  -.440  (.070)  .0000 
“Poor”  -1.095  (.170)  -.366  (.102)  .0000 
(d) Whether or not donor adjusts nominal donations (higher rate reclaimers) 
Adjusters  -1.929 (.297)  -1.431 (.179)  .0581 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses, p-value is for the test that the match and rebate elasticity are equal  
 
 5.3   Adjusters/non-adjusters  
Finally, we consider that the difference between match and rebate elasticities may be 
explained by the high levels of non-adjustment because of the way in which the match 
and  rebate  differentially  impact  on  gross  donations  among  non-adjusters  –  the 
elasticities of gross donations with respect to match and rebate among non-adjusters are 
-1 and zero respectively.  Assuming that there is a single underlying elasticity, ε, with 
respect to changes in the match or rebate, but that only a proportion of donors π
m ( π
r )   17 
adjust to the match (rebate) then the observed match ( ) and rebate ( ) elasticities are 
given by: 
,               (3) 
                 (4) 
The observed match elasticity will be greater than the observed rebate elasticity if  
 
                 
(5) 
If the probabilities of adjusting to the match and rebate are the same (and less than one), 
the observed match elasticity will always be greater than the observed rebate elasticity. 
In practice, we find that more people adjust to a change in the rebate than to a change in 
the match (see Table 3). However, based on the observed proportions adjusting (and 
focusing on responses to an increase in match/rebate), the observed match elasticity for 
higher-rate reclaimers would still be greater than the observed rebate elasticity so long 
as the elasticity among adjusters is less than 3.70. 
The last row of Table 4 shows estimates of match and rebate elasticities separately for 
adjusters (i.e. donors who adjust to at least one of the two scenarios). Not surprisingly, 
gross  donations  are  much  more  responsive  to  changes  in  the  rebate  for  this  group 
compared  to  the  rest  of  the  sample.  While  the  match  elasticity  is  still  higher,  the 
difference is no longer statistically significant. This finding indicates that much of the 
explanation for the large observed difference between match and rebate elasticities both 
here and in the earlier experimental studies is likely to lie in the fact that many donors 
do not adjust their nominal donations in response to a tax change, and the differential 
implications  of  changes  in  the  match  and  rebate  for  gross  donations  among  non-
adjusters. 
This provides an explanation for why match incentives have a bigger impact on money 
going to charities than rebates. If many donors do not adjust their nominal donations 
when  tax  incentives  change,  then  charities  will  benefit  much  more  from  changes  in 
match incentives than from changes in rebates. However, it begs another question of 
why so many donors do not adjust their nominal donations.  
Table 5 summarizes the reasons that donors give for not changing their donation in 
response  to  the  proposed  hypothetical  scenario.  Approximately  one-fifth  of  non-
˜  e 
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adjusters say that they take no account of tax incentives at all in deciding how much to 
give. However, the most common reason – given by just over half of all non-adjusters – 
is that donors decide on their level of nominal donations before taking account of the tax 
relief.    
  Table 5: Main reason for not adjusting nominal donations 
  Non-reclaimers  Reclaimers 
I make my decision about how much to give before 
considering the tax relief 
55.8%  49.2% 
The tax relief has no effect on my decision about 
how much to give 
20.1%  19.2% 
I have a regular commitment to giving money that 
I don’t want to change 
11.2%  20.0% 
I prefer to give a rounded amount and not make 
small adjustments 
5.5%  5.7% 
The change in tax is so small, it is not worth 
bothering about 
4.6%  3.6% 
Other/ don’t know  2.9%  2.5% 
Number of observations  583  647 
 
One interpretation of this is that donors care about nominal donations and not about how 
much the charity receives. Within the literature on why people give to charity, there are 
a number of possible explanations for this, including donors’ desire to signal either their 
wealth or generosity.
20 Consistent with this, the results in column (2) of Table 3 show 
that nominal donations respond more to a change in the rebate than to a change in the 
match. But, if individuals really cared about their nominal donations then we would not 
expect any change in nominal donations when the match changed since the match rate 
has no bearing on the price of the signal, which is affected only by the rebate. By a 
similar token, we would expect nominal donations to respond even more than they do to 
a change in the rebate. In our survey data, we cannot reject that the elasticity of nominal 
donations with respect to the match is the same as the elasticity with respect to the 
                                                 
20 See Andreoni (2006) and Vesterlund for discussions of motives for giving.   19 
rebate.
21 Among those with a reasonable level of understanding (who could be assumed 
to understand that the rebate affects the price of the signal), the nominal match and 
rebate elasticities are closer still.
22 
Another interpretation is that these responses indicate that tax incentives are simply not 
“salient” for many individuals’ decisions about how much to give. This is consistent 
with other recent evidence that many consumers do not fully optimize with respect to 
tax-inclusive prices (Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009). In these studies, the fact that 
taxes are not salient is attributable to their being “shrouded” attributes. In the case of tax 
incentives for giving to charity, the information on the tax-inclusive price is available – 
or at least the information needed to work out the tax-inclusive price is available – but 
individuals may have to incur some processing costs to work out the new tax-inclusive 
price and to respond accordingly.
23 Chetty et al (2009) show that even small processing 
costs can give rise to non-salience since the welfare costs from failing to process tax 
changes are second order. Other costs associated with responding to tax changes – such 
as regular commitments, which are mentioned by one-fifth of non-adjusters in Table 5 – 
would  add  to  the  costs  of  immediately  re-optimizing  with  respect  to  the  new  tax-
inclusive price. In principle, these processing and adjustment costs could explain why a 
large  proportion  of  donors  appear  not  to  respond  to  tax  changes  even  when  all  the 
relevant information is potentially available to  them. The fact that larger donors are 
more likely to adjust also fits with this potential explanation. 
6  Conclusions and implications for policy design 
An explicit aim of this study was to test earlier findings on the differential impact of 
match and rebate incentives in relation to broad-based fiscal incentives – with a view to 
informing public policy. Finding suitable and timely evidence for policy-making can 
prove challenging. Results from lab and field experiments may not be externally valid 
and there may not be suitable “natural” experiments from past policy. As an alternative, 
                                                 
21 The elasticity of nominal donations is the same as the gross elasticity in the case of the rebate, and equal 
to one plus the gross elasticity in the case of the match.  
22 This was also supported by other choice experiment questions in the survey that revealed that more 
people would prefer tax relief in the form of a match-only system to the current match and rebate system. 
This would not be the case if donors cared about nominal donations.     
23 See Scharf and Smith (2010) for further analysis.    20 
we  used  a  survey-based  approach  which  asked  donors  how  they  would  respond  to 
changes in tax incentives. While we might not want to rely on a hypothetical survey as 
the only piece of evidence on how donors respond to the two types of incentive, in this 
case it provided a useful test of the findings from the experimental studies in relation to 
fiscal incentives.  
Taking  as  a  given  that  the  government  has  an  objective  of  promoting  private 
contributions through fiscal incentives,
24 this difference between the effect of match and 
rebate elasticities suggests that it would be more effective to offer tax subsidies in the 
form of a match rather than a rebate, in terms of securing more money for charities. 
However, a match-based system could be at a higher cost for the government not only 
because a higher match would more generous than the current system for non reclaimers 
but also because reclaimers do not reduce their nominal donations. A key question for 
policy-makers is whether it is possible to introduce a revenue-neutral policy change that 
will lead to an increase the amount of money going to charities.  
To provide some further insight into this, Figure 1 shows indicative estimates of the 
likely overall effect on gross donations and the estimated percentage change in the cost 
of  tax  relief  for  each  of  the  four  scenarios  that  involve  withdrawing  the  rebate  and 
increasing the value of the match for higher-rate donors
25 – £0.30, £0.37, £0.50 and 
£0.66 – together with smoothed, linear predictions through these point estimates. These 
take into account adjustments by reclaimers and non-reclaimers from the survey and the 
relative proportions of the two groups in the population of Gift Aid donors.
26 
The results give  an indication that it would be possible to increase  gross donations, 
without  increasing  the  cost  of  tax  relief  compared  to  the  current  system  –  by 
                                                 
24 Behind this lies a much broader set of issues relating to the role of private provision alongside public 
provision of collective goods (see Feldstein and Clotfelter, 1977, Warr 1982, Scharf, 2000) and the choice 
of tax subsidies versus direct government grants as a way of encouraging private provision (see Roberts, 
1987, Andreoni and Payne, 2001). 
25 In principle it would be possible to give a higher match on donations from all taxpayers and this option 
is considered in relation to the £0.30 and £0.37 match in Scharf and Smith (2009)  
26 We assume that 35% higher-rate taxpayers reclaim on the basis of analysis of the Justgiving sample on 
the proportion of reclaimers and HMRC statistics on the value of tax relief claimed. See Appendix A1 for 
further information. We carry out sensitivity analysis, varying the proportion of higher-rate taxpayers who 
reclaim in the population by ten percentage points above and below the central assumption (shown by the 
paler lines in Figure 1).  
    21 
withdrawing  the  rebate  and  replacing  it  with  a  match  in  the  range  £0.42  to  £0.47, 
depending on the proportion of higher-rate reclaimers. Alternatively, there is a possible 
policy change that maintains the current level of gross donations but with a cost saving 
(a match rate of £0.35). The form of tax incentive – and the differential responses to 
match and rebate – therefore should be taken into account in the design of public policy.  
 
Figure 1: Estimated change in gross donations and cost of tax relief 
associated with match-only options 
        
Note to figure: The central, bold line indicates the percentage changes in gross donations and the cost of 
tax relief compared to the current  system based on an assumption that 35% of  higher-rate taxpayers 
reclaim the rebate. The paler lines show the same, assuming that 25% and 45% reclaim. 
The second contribution of this paper was to shed light on why match incentives are 
more effective than rebate incentives. The difference can largely be explained by the fact 
that most donors are unresponsive to changes in tax incentives in terms of changing their 
nominal donations – which in turn means that changes in the match rate have a direct 
impact on how much money the charity receives whilechanges in the rebate only affect 
the cost to the donor. We also argued that the observed patterns of adjustment fit better 
with  a  story  in  which  tax  incentives  are  not  salient  to  many  donors  rather  than  an 
alternative story in which donors care only about nominal donations, but this was not not 
the main focus of our survey. Further work on the salience of tax incentives to donors’ 
decisions would seem a fruitful area for future research.   
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Total donations – last 12 months  £1037  £5121 
Donations through Gift Aid – last 12 months  £514  £3842 
Female  0.38  0.20 
Aged < 35  0.28  0.07 
Aged 35-44  0.31  0.17 
Aged 45-54  0.26  0.34 
Aged 55-64  0.12  0.24 
Aged 65-74  0.02  0.12 
Aged 75+  0.00  0.06 
Individual income < £30K  0.00  0.00 
Individual income £30K - £40K   0.00  0.00 
Individual income £40K - £75K  0.62  0.42 
Individual income £75K - £100K  0.13  0.14 
Individual income £100K - £200K  0.13  0.23 
Individual income > £200K  0.04  0.09 
Employed full-time  0.87  0.60 
Employed part-time  0.02  0.05 
Self-employed  0.07  0.13 
Retired  0.03  0.19 
Other non-working  0.01  0.02 
Highest qualification – degree  0.45  0.40 
Highest qualification – higher degree  0.35  0.42 
Married  0.60  0.80 
Cohabiting  0.15  0.05 
Single  0.18  0.09 
Widowed  0.02  0.02 
Divorced  0.04  0.03 
Separated  0.01  0.01 
Ever had children  0.54  0.77 
Understands tax incentives  0.46  0.64 
Regular giver  0.40  0.35 
Ever worked as a volunteer  0.62  0.66 
Ever worked for a charity  0.10  0.10 
Type of charity supported     
   Medical  0.64  0.60 
   Education  0.11  0.24 
   Religious  0.17  0.46 
   Community  0.10  0.14 
   Arts  0.14  0.30 
   Sports  0.07  0.05 
   Hospices  0.48  0.48 
   Rights  0.15  0.19 
   Environment  0.17  0.26 
   Housing  0.05  0.09 
   Overseas aid  0.43  0.65 
   Welfare  0.52  0.58 
   Animals  0.18  0.17 
   Homeless  0.25  0.37 
   Disaster  0.39  0.53 
   Rescue  0.14  0.17 
Sample size  633  809 
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Sampling 
 
Our sample would ideally be representative of the population of Gift Aid donors but this is 
unlikely because of both sampling and response bias. In practice, there is no population 
information on Gift Aid donors to allow us to investigate the extent of bias. The best benchmark 
is the Individual Giving Survey (IGS), a population-based survey that collects information on 
giving, including the use of Gift Aid. However, as shown in the figure below, the IGS is also 
likely to suffer from bias particularly in not capturing higher-value donors – the largest donation 
was £46,000 in the last year in the IGS, compared to more than 100 donors who gave more than 
£100,000 in the CAF/Justgiving sample.  
Figure A1: Distribution of total donations over the last 12 months 
 
To analyse the effect of possible policy options, we re-weight the taxpayer groups in the 
CAF/Justgiving sample to reflect estimated population shares, assuming that 80 per cent of Gift 
Aid donors are basic rate taxpayers and assuming that 35 per cent of higher-rate taxpayers 
reclaim.  
The estimate of the proportion of Gift Aid donors who are higher-rate taxpayers is based 
on individuals’ reported personal, gross annual incomes in the IGS. This is not perfect 
since individuals were asked to give banded amounts which do not directly correspond 
to the threshold for paying higher-rate tax. A sizeable proportion refused to answer or 
did not know their income. Assuming that the incomes of this group were distributed in 
the same way as the rest of the sample, the estimated proportion of higher-rate donors 
was 0.204. Assuming that the refusals and don’t knows were higher-rate taxpayers 
(which seems more likely in the case of refusals), the estimated proportion was 0.247. 
These estimates assume that everyone in the £36,400 - £38,999 band is a higher-rate 
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Excluding this band, the proportions are 0.179 and 0.234 respectively. For the analysis, 
the central assumption is that 20 per cent of Gift Aid donors are higher-rate taxpayers.  
In the unweighted sample, 55.9 per cent of higher-rate taxpayers reported that they 
reclaimed higher-rate relief. This is likely to over-estimate the (unknown) proportion of 
reclaimers in the population. A person with a CAF account is more likely than the 
typical higher-rate donor to reclaim the additional relief; indeed this may be one of the 
motivations for opening an account in the first place.  There is no information on 
reclaiming in the IGS.  The proportion of reclaimers in the Justgiving sample – at 34.4 
per cent – is likely to be closer to the proportion in the population.  Therefore, the 
assumption used in this report is that 35.0 per cent of higher-rate donors reclaim the 
additional relief.  As well as reflecting the proportion in the Justgiving sample, this 
proportion is also consistent with HMRC statistics on the value of tax relief claimed.  
This re-weighting reduces the mean annual donation in the sample from £2,272 to £1,345. This 
is still larger than the mean annual donation in the IGS sample as shown in the table below. But 
at least some of this is explained by the larger tail in the CAF/Justgiving sample. Excluding 
donations of £50,000 or more (of which there are none in the IGS sample), the mean annual 
donation in the CAF/Justgiving sample falls to £1,137. 
 
     Mean annual donation 
  CAF/ Justgiving  IGS 
Unweighted  £2,273  £854 
Weighted  £1,345  £854 
Weighted (excluding donations >= £50,000)  £1,137  £854 
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Appendix 2: How the scenarios were presented   
 
Initial donation 
How likely are you to make any Gift Aid donations to a charity within the next six months? This 
could be a one-off donation or a regular donation set up as a standing order or direct debit. 
·  Certain 
·  Very likely 
·  Fairly likely 
·  Not very likely 
·  Not at all likely 
·  Don’t know 
 
IF ‘Certain’ or ‘Very likely’ or ‘Fairly likely’ 
 And how much do you think that you are likely to give (to the nearest pound)?  If the donation 
you are thinking about is a regular direct debit or standing order, please give the total of that 
donation for a six month period. 
 
Introduction to scenarios 
The Gift Aid scheme allows charities to reclaim the basic rate income tax on your donation and 
allows higher rate taxpayers to claim back higher rate tax relief.  You are now going to be 
presented with two hypothetical changes to the Gift Aid scheme – either to the amount that the 
charity can reclaim and/or to the amount that higher rate taxpayers can claim back.  In each case 
you will be asked to consider whether the amount of money that you are likely to give to charity 
would be affected by the proposed changes. 
 
Example  
Through the Gift Aid scheme, the charity you are donating to reclaims the basic rate income tax 
on your donation.  This is worth 25 pence for every £1 you donate.   
Suppose instead that the charity received 30 pence for every £1 you donate.  (Assume that the 
amount of higher rate relief that you can claim back is unchanged). 
 
Thinking about your donation of [£X] would this change affect the amount you are likely to 
give? SINGLE CODE ONLY 
·  Yes - I would give more than [£X] 
·  Yes - I would give less than [£X] 
·  No - I would give the same amount 
·  Don’t know 
 
IF yes, how much would you be likely to give (to the nearest pound)? 
·  (write in) 
·  Don’t know 
 
IF ‘don’t know’, which of these comes closest to what you think you might increase/ reduce 
your donation by?   29 
·  By 10% or less? 
·  By more than 10%? 
·  Don’t know 
 
If more than 10%, Would you increase/ reduce your donation by 25% or more? 
·  Yes 
·  No 
·  Don’t know 
  
If yes, Would you increase/ reduce your donation by 50% or more? 
·  Yes 
·  No 
·  Don’t know 
 
     Figure A2: How the scenarios appeared to respondents 
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Appendix 3 
      P-values: test for significant differences across scenarios –   H0:   βs  = βz ,  s ≠ z 
  
Higher-rate taxpayers 
Dependent variable = ln (gross donations) 
  M25R30  M20R25  M25R20  M50R0  M30R0  M30R0  M37R0  M66R0  M50R0 
M30R25  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000 
M25R30    .000  .000  .000  .000  .020  .449  .000  .000 
M20R25      .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000 
M25R20        .000  .000  .096  .001  .000  .000 
M50R0          .000  .000  .000  .000  .842 
M30R0            .124  .000  .000  .000 
M30R0              .000  .000  .000 
M37R0                .000  .000 
M66R0                  .000 
Dependent variable = ln (nominal donations) 
  M25R30  M20R25  M25R20  M50R0  M30R0  M30R0  M37R0  M66R0  M50R0 
M30R25  .000  .219  .273  .026  .000  .000  .007  .024  .017 
M25R30    .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000 
M20R25      .850  .317  .000  .008  .139  .297  .234 
M25R20        .257  .000  .005  .107  .240  .187 
M50R0          .000  .102  .632  .958  .842 
M30R0            .124  .007  .002  .003 
M30R0              .103  .118  .156 
M37R0                .674  .783 
M66R0                  .838 
 
 